



Kaspersky Industrial
Cybersecurity
Conference 2024

KICS solution overview – a native XDR platform for critical infrastructure protection

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kaspersky






Data enrichment

- Protection status
- Security audit
- Network communications
- Host telemetry
- Hardware management
- Alarms and Incidents

KICS for Nodes. Endpoint protection options


 Windows


 Portable Scanner


 Linux


 Audit Agent

 Gateway


 Engineering workstation

 Historian server

 System management workstation

 SCADA server

 Embedded systems

 Operation workstation



Kaspersky Industrial CyberSecurity for Nodes

- Compatibility* with Industrial Automation Vendors
- Legacy OS support starting from Windows XP SP2
- Non-blocking (statistic mode) availability
- No reboot on installation, update or upgrade
- Air-gapped database updates
- Components and settings specific for OT
- Modular architecture – component selection
- Tunable system resource consumption

- Anti-Malware
- Application Launch Control
- Device Control
- File Integrity Control
- PLC Integrity Control*
- Anti-Cryptor
- Exploit Prevention*
- Network Threat Prevention
- Firewall
- Windows Log inspector*
- Windows Registry Monitor*
- Portable Scanner
- Security Audit
- EDR Agent

Industrial Endpoint Protection



KICS for Nodes. Industrial control systems support


Verified compatibility with ICS vendors

- Cooperation with industrial automation vendors
- Compatibility and interoperability verification
- Reference architectures

Recommended settings

Recommended trusted processes and exclusions available out of the box and available for application on installation phase

- Expertise based on compatibility verification results
- ICS vendor guides
- Technical support and issue resolution



Monitoring of actual PLC project, using direct communication with PLC over its native protocol

Step 1. PLC Project Investigation:
Upload a project from PLC to use as a benchmark

Step 2. PLC Project Integrity Check:
Create a periodical task to check the integrity of downloaded project

General Settings

Name: <New PLC>

Name: Siemens Simatic S7-300

Description: Siemens Simatic S7-300

Wait for connection (sec): Siemens Simatic S7-400

Connection settings: Siemens Simatic S7-400H

IP address: Siemens Simatic S7-1200

Port: Siemens Simatic S7-1500

Rack number: Siemens Siprotec 4

Slot number: Schneider Modicon M340

Read data blocks

Apply password

New password: Schneider Modicon M580

Password: CODESYS V3 based device

OWEN PLC210

Fastwel CPM723-01

Prosoft Regul R500

Emerson DeltaV

Show

Password is not set

Get the host with **KICS for Nodes** installed



Portable Scanner files



Deploy **Portable Scanner** in required configuration onto:


- Any USB-drive or
- Secure USB-drive with hidden password-protected storage for inventory and report files

IT **OT**

Define standalone hosts, not EPP-equipped devices and guest laptops

Windows and Linux support + legacy OS (incl. **Windows 2000**)

Air gap



Inspect hosts one by one, the results are saved on the drive:


- Host inventory
- Anti-Virus scan
- Vulnerability scan
- Traffic sample capture



Scanning results:

- Reports (HTML, txt)
- Traffic samples

KICS for Nodes. All-in-one endpoint sensor



Endpoint sensor for enhanced asset inventory

- Host attributes (host name, vendor, model, OS and more)
- Network communications
- Hardware and software monitoring
- Security audit for discovering vulnerabilities and misconfigurations

EDR agent

- Network alert enrichment by accurate host information (processes, users)
- Kill-chain view for root-cause analysis
- Response options



Kaspersky
Industrial CyberSecurity
for Networks

KICS for Networks


Network monitoring and threat detection
for industrial enterprises

Network traffic analysis, detection and
response solution

Core of KICS Platform, a single place
for data accumulation, management
and incident investigation

Multifunctional platform for asset
discovery, risk management, security audit,
extended detection and response (XDR)





Discovery methods

1. Passive Monitoring (SPAN session)
2. Endpoint agent data (SPAN-less)
3. Active polling
4. Import (manual or automated)

Devices: the start of the journey

- Device-centric approach, data, events, network behavior statistics linked to devices
- Device categories, importance, risks are calculated automatically
- Device monitoring, all changes are registered

The screenshot displays the Kaspersky Industrial Cybersecurity interface. On the left, a table lists various devices with columns for Name, Status, Address information, Category, and Security state. The 'KICS-WIN7' device is highlighted. On the right, a detailed view for 'KICS-WIN7' is shown, including its security state (OK), importance (Medium), and status (Authorized). Below this, there are tabs for General, Addresses, Process control, Topology settings, Equipment, and Configurations. A warning message indicates that address information is not updated for devices with Authorized status. The 'Address information' section shows details for the 'Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection', including MAC and IP addresses. The 'Hardware' section lists details for the VMware Virtual Platform, and the 'Endpoint Agent' section shows it is active.

| Name | Status | Address information | Category | Security state |
|------------------|------------|------------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| Device 003 | Authorized | 192.168.5.10 | Other | OK |
| kics-winxsp3 | Authorized | 192.168.5.21 | Gateway | OK |
| KICS-WIN7 | Authorized | 00:0c:29:00:94:f3; 192.16... | Workstation | OK |
| KICS-WIN7-RU | Authorized | 00:0c:29:96:84:d1; 192.16... | Workstation | OK |
| WinCOA | Authorized | 00:0c:29:bc:61:0b; 192.16... | HMI / SCADA | OK |
| kics-astra | Authorized | 00:0c:29:ff:13:e0; 192.16... | Workstation | OK |
| kics-ubuntu | Authorized | 00:0c:29:0c:d2:49; 192.16... | Workstation | OK |
| kics-centos9 | Authorized | 00:0c:29:8b:44:12; 192.16... | Workstation | OK |
| Device 002 | Authorized | 192.168.5.42 | Other | OK |
| Device 004 | Authorized | 192.168.5.55 | Other | OK |
| Device 012 | Authorized | 192.168.10.10 | Other | OK |
| KICS-WINSRV2... | Authorized | Several values | Server | OK |

KICS-WIN7

Security state: OK
Importance: Medium
Status: Authorized

Category: Workstation
Network name: KICS-WIN7
Group: -

General | Addresses | Process control | Topology settings | Equipment | Configurations

In monitoring mode, address information is not updated for devices with Authorized status.

Created: 2024-09-24 13:31:25
Last modified: 2024-09-24 13:38:04
Last seen: 2024-10-03 20:39:55

Address information

Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection

MAC address: 00:0c:29:00:94:f3
IP address: 192.168.5.22

Show addresses of all network interfaces (1)


| Hardware | | Software | |
|----------|-------------------------|----------|------------------------------------|
| Vendor | VMware, Inc. | Vendor | Microsoft |
| Model | VMware Virtual Platform | Name | - |
| Version | VMware Virtual Platform | Version | 6.1.7601 Service Pack 1 Build 7601 |

OS: Windows 7
Router: No
Device ID: 9
Public key: -

Risks: Configuration problems, Insecure network architecture

Endpoint Agent

Connection: Active
Last connection to EPP: 2024-10-03 20:44:38
Version: 4.0.0.272




Network topology diagram

- Physical network connection diagram
- Shows switch port a device is connected to
- Built automatically with network equipment polling

Network interactions map

- Logical network communication diagram
- Protocols and amount of traffic
- Grouping, search and filtering



Software, patches and user accounts inventory

Inventory lists of software, patches, users and executables

Data collected automatically after integration is configured

| Appli... | Name | Vendor | Device | Installed | Version | Data received |
|--------------------------|---|------------|---------------|------------|------------|---------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | SINAUT ST7 - TD7 Library Basic01 V2.2 + ServicePack 1 | | kics-winxpsp3 | | | 2024-09-04 11:18:29 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | SINAUT ST7 - ProTools V4.1 | | kics-winxpsp3 | | | 2024-09-04 11:18:29 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | SINAUT ST7cc V02.07.00.00_11.01.00.01 | | kics-winxpsp3 | | | 2024-09-04 11:18:29 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | SIMATIC WinCC Smart Tools V7.0 + SP3 | Siemens AG | kics-winxpsp3 | 2022-01-17 | 07.00.0300 | 2024-09-04 11:18:29 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | SIMATIC WinCC Runtime V7.0 + SP3 | Siemens AG | kics-winxpsp3 | 2022-01-17 | 07.00.0300 | 2024-09-04 11:18:29 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | SIMATIC WinCC OPC Server V3.9 + Upd1 | Siemens AG | kics-winxpsp3 | 2022-01-17 | 03.09.0001 | 2024-09-04 11:18:29 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | SIMATIC WinCC Configuration V7.0 + SP3 | Siemens AG | kics-winxpsp3 | 2022-01-17 | 07.00.0300 | 2024-09-04 11:18:29 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | SIMATIC STEP 7 V5.5 + SP3 | Siemens AG | kics-winxpsp3 | 2022-01-12 | 05.05.0300 | 2024-09-04 11:18:29 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | SIMATIC S7-PCT V3.0 | Siemens AG | kics-winxpsp3 | 2022-01-12 | 03.00.0000 | 2024-09-04 11:18:29 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | SIMATIC NET PC Software Edition 2008 + SP4 | Siemens AG | kics-winxpsp3 | 2022-01-17 | 714.0 | 2024-09-04 11:18:29 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Siemens Automation License Manager V5.2 + Upd1 | Siemens AG | kics-winxpsp3 | 2022-01-12 | 05.02.0001 | 2024-09-04 11:18:29 |

Quick focus change to devices and events

Basic change management, alerts on new and missing previously known item

Application/script launches and non-resident software

A catalog with detected recent launches, including scripts, not installed and temporary applications

The screenshot displays the 'Executable files' section of the Kaspersky Endpoint Security interface. The main window shows a list of files with columns for Name, Product, and Vendor. The 'PROFinetIO System (V12.00.00.00_45.03.00.04)' entry is selected and highlighted. A detailed view of this file is shown on the right, listing various attributes such as File ID, Device, Product, Product version, Vendor, Path, File size, Attributes, MD5 hash, SHA256 hash, Signature, Data received, Created, Changed, and Origin.

| Name | Product | Vendor |
|--|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| CCAgent Service (K07.01.07.00_01.29.00.05 release) | SIMATIC SCS® | SIEMENS AG |
| CCDBUtils (K07.01.04.00_01.33.00.01 release) | SIMATIC WinCC Common Archiving® | SIEMENS AG |
| CCEClient (K07.01.07.00_01.29.00.05 release) | SIMATIC SCS® | SIEMENS AG |
| CCEServer (K07.01.07.00_01.29.00.05 release) | SIMATIC SCS® | SIEMENS AG |
| Extended Program Manager (V7.0 incl. SP3) | WINCC_SCADA | SIEMENS AG |
| Management of SIMATIC PC components (T4.4) | Stationmanager | Siemens AG |
| PROFinetIO System (V12.00.00.00_45.03.00.04) | SIMATIC NET Software | SIEMENS AG |
| PROFinetIO System (V12.00.00.00_45.09.00.08) | SIMATIC NET Software | SIEMENS AG |
| Project Manager (V7.0 incl. SP3) | WINCC_SCADA | SIEMENS AG |
| S7 Global Services (Release 5.5) | SIEMENS® STEP 7/S7(TM) Programma... | SIEMENS AG |
| S7TraceServiceX Module (K08.03.01.00_01.02.00.01) | SIMATIC Device Operating System® | SIEMENS AG |
| SCSMonitorX (K07.01.07.00_01.29.00.05 release) | SIMATIC SCS® | SIEMENS AG |
| Siemens SIMATIC ItoPG Help Service (K08.03.01.00_... | SIMATIC Device Operating System® | SIEMENS AG |

| Attribute | Value |
|-----------------|--|
| File ID | 53 |
| Device | kics-winxps3 |
| Product | SIMATIC NET Software |
| Product version | V12.00.00.00_45.03.00.04 |
| Vendor | SIEMENS AG |
| Path | C:\Program Files\Common Files\Siemens\SimNetCom\pnio mgr.exe |
| File size | 2.6 MB |
| Attributes | Archive |
| MD5 hash | b81648a57f1ded30399c38b0fe87e72f |
| SHA256 hash | 66e366becf8327fb3909d817c5849e384df1793fcf56060d6be2d1b97d07d856 |
| Signature | Invalid |
| Data received | 2024-09-03 15:06:20 |
| Created | 2012-08-16 10:29:32 |
| Changed | 2012-08-16 10:29:32 |
| Origin | Telemetry (Endpoint Agent) |

Key details to locate file on host, check file reputation using Kaspersky TIP or perform a response action

Security Audit

It ensures the secure configuration of assets and monitors any changes for potential security risks and compliance issues

KICS Platform has an internal subsystem to extract more security state data and identify risks and misconfigurations

Active polling

Basic inventory and risk detection technology

Vulnerability and compliance monitoring

Vulnerability search and compliance checks against pre-defined policy

Configuration control

Change management and security settings monitoring





Kaspersky
Industrial CyberSecurity
for Networks

SSH

Agentless

Linux devices
Cisco IOS devices
Siemens Scalance
Moxa PT-series

Security settings, users, ARP tables, executable processes, running config, start-up config, routing tables, and more

Native PLC protocol

Industrial

Siemens SIMATIC S7-300/400
Schneider Electric M340/580
Allen-Bradley ControlLogix*
Emerson DeltaV*

- Operation mode
- Detailed I/O subsystem info
- Extended downloaded project info (control blocks and hashes)
- CPU event log

KICS for Nodes

Agent

Windows/Linux workstations and servers:

- Security settings and policies
- Applications and patches
- Users and groups
- Services
- Drivers
- Scheduled tasks
- Shared folders
- Startup objects

Rack & slots

I/O subsystem information with extra details for each card

Security settings

Available security parameters, memory status and CPU logs

The screenshot shows the SIMATIC 300 software interface. At the top, there's a title bar 'SIMATIC 300' and a toolbar with buttons for 'Edit', 'Change status', 'Show related', 'Create job', and 'Threat response'. Below the toolbar, the 'Security state' is 'Critical', 'Importance' is 'High', and 'Status' is 'Authorized'. The 'Category' is 'PLC'. Below this, there are tabs for 'General', 'Addresses', 'Process control', 'Topology settings', 'Equipment', and 'Configurations'. The 'Equipment' tab is active, showing a 'CPU 315-2 PN/DP' configuration. A rack diagram shows 'Slot 1' as a 'Power supply module' and 'Slot 2' as the 'CPU'. Below the rack diagram, there's a table of properties: Vendor (Original Siemens Equipment), Type (CPU), Model (CPU 315-2 PN/DP), Order number (6ES7 315-2EH14-0AB0), and Serial number (S C-JOLD29762017). Further down, there's an 'Advanced' section with memory status and security settings. The ID is 'SIMATIC 300 / CPU-300 / CPU 315-2 PN/DP / 6ES7 315-2EH14-0AB0 / V3.2'.

| | | | |
|----------------|------------|--------------|-----|
| Security state | Critical | Category | PLC |
| Importance | High | Network name | - |
| Status | Authorized | Group | - |

General Addresses Process control Topology settings **Equipment** Configurations

CPU 315-2 PN/DP

Rack configuration:
Slot 1: Power supply module
Slot 2: CPU
Slot 3: Slot
Slot 4: Slot
Slot 5: Slot
Slot 6: Slot
Slot 7: Slot
Slot 8: Slot
Slot 9: Slot
Slot 10: Slot

| | | | |
|---------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Vendor | Original Siemens Equipment | Hardware platform version | 8.0.1 |
| Type | CPU | Firmware version | V3.2.14 |
| Model | CPU 315-2 PN/DP | Bootloader version | A37.12.12 |
| Order number | 6ES7 315-2EH14-0AB0 | Operating mode | Requested: unknown Current: run |
| Serial number | S C-JOLD29762017 | | |

ID SIMATIC 300 / CPU-300 / CPU 315-2 PN/DP / 6ES7 315-2EH14-0AB0 / V3.2

Advanced

Memory status
region-LoadMemory type=Assigned amount=67764
region-LoadMemory type=Free amount=8320844
region-RetentiveMemory type=Assigned amount=13068
region-RetentiveMemory type=Free amount=118004
region-WorkMemory type=Assigned amount=49216
region-WorkMemory type=Free amount=344900

Security Settings
selector_protection_level=Can read and write,
param_protection_level=Password on write

Logs [Download](#)

List of vulnerabilities


Firmware and software vulnerabilities

Description

Conditions, mitigations, reference links

Compliance reports

Conditions, mitigations, reference links



SECURITY AUDIT

Security audit results

4 devices
Kaspersky ICS CERT vulnerabilities database for SCADA

| Connection Server | Scan start | Scan end |
|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Server | 2024-02-08 14:56:15 | 2024-02-08 14:58:18 |

8.2 CVE-2018-11451

Change status Show related

Detected at: 2024-02-06 18:27:36.692
Base score: 7.5
CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
Source of vulnerability: Nvd
CVE: CVE-2018-11451
Device group: Line Bays
Attack conditions: For successful exploit, IEC61850-MMS needs to be activated

General info

Security audit job data

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------|
| OVAL generator | Kaspersky ICS-CERT OVAL generator | | |
| Date and time of set generation | 2024-01-18 11:47:34 | Number of rules in job | 1146 |
| Number of rules in set | 1146 | Polling method | Local agent |

General scan results

Vulnerabilities detected: 312 (Devices scanned: 4/4)

| Inventory | Vulnerabilities |
|---------------|------------------|
| Compliance: 6 | Not detected: 4K |
| Mismatch: 306 | Detected: 62 |

312

4K

Configuration Control: what we see

Each configuration template has its own view – text listing, list or table, depending on content

The diff is shown as changes in lines, highlighting the new and missing lines

WinCCOA / Users
Configuration comparison

2024-09-09 11:48:29 ↔ 2024-09-09 11:54:29

Changes - 1 ≈ 1

| User name | SID | Full name | Groups | Inactive |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|----------|
| WinCCOA\admin | S-1-5-21-412538312... | | S-1-5-21-412538312... | No |
| WinCCOA\HomeGr... | S-1-5-21-412538312... | HomeGroupUser\$ | S-1-5-21-412538312... | No |
| - WinCCOA\newuser | S-1-5-21-412538312... | newuser | S-1-5-32-545-WinC... | No |
| WinCCOA\Админи... | S-1-5-21-412538312... | | S-1-5-21-412538312... | Yes |
| ≈ WinCCOA\Гость | S-1-5-21-412538312... | | S-1-5-32-546-WinC... | Yes |

| | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| User name | WinCCOA\Гость |
| SID | S-1-5-21-4125383128-3846601757-31039502-501 |
| Full name | |
| Groups | S-1-5-32-546-WinCCOA\Гости |
| Inactive | - No |
| | + Yes |
| Locked | No |
| Change password at next logon | - |
| Password change by user is allowed | No |
| Password validity period unlimited | Yes |

PLC configuration is a combination of hardware and software attributes, security settings and current project

```
SIMATIC 300
Extended configuration of Siemens SIMATIC S7-300/S7-400

Compare Set as benchmark 2024-09-13 12:31:17

55 physicalModel:
56   rackCount: 1
57   rackSegments:
58     - 11
59     - 0
60 project:
61   blocks:
62     - author: ""
63       blockLang: 5 (DB)
64       blockNumber: 1
65       blockType: DB
66       checksum: FA09E511602A01A8C192513CDE37CDEF
67       codeDate: "2018-07-25 17:39:59"
68     - author: ""
69       blockLang: 5 (DB)
70       blockNumber: 10
71       blockType: DB
72       checksum: B1C4AF29292C485D93E9A90A855B212D
73       codeDate: "2017-03-10 16:16:25"
74     - author: ""
75       blockLang: 5 (DB)
76       blockNumber: 100
77       blockType: DB
78       checksum: B54C53B63997954AA1A25BCD2BCD92F2
79       codeDate: "2016-02-05 13:30:40"
```

Detection and response

Detection technologies

IDS, deep packet inspection, brute force and scan detectors, SIGMA, and more


Event correlation

Network and host security event enrichment and correlation to identify incidents

Investigation graph and responses

Graph with kill-chain view for root-cause analysis, response options





Regular updates

- Asset discovery rules
- Intrusion detection rules
- Vulnerability databases
- Compliance audit rules
- Event correlation rules



Kaspersky
ICS CERT

Deep packet inspection for OT and IT protocols

- Command control
- PLC project modification monitoring
- Automatic tags detection and process control rules

Event correlation

Host and network sourced events

Industrial DPI events

Device manipulation commands and abnormal process values

Description

Data enrichment, possible causes, mitigation advice and MITRE mapping

9.7 Mismatch detected (SEQUENCE COMMAND MISMATCH)

Change status Show related Threat response Create allow rule Download traffic Copy details

- Authorized change in the industrial process.
- Reconfiguration of the network.

Impact:

- Disconnection of devices.
- Reconfiguration of devices.
- Change of industrial process parameters.

Threat elimination measures:

- Identify the event originator based on the address information (IP address, MAC address) and disconnect it from the network if it is an unautho the required functions.
- Check the operation of network equipment and information security tools and change their settings if necessary.
- If the event was registered as a result of equipment replacement and the new equipment is permitted for use, create a Command Control tech

| Application | | Application user | |
|--------------------------------|--|-------------------|--------------------------|
| Application name | Communications Front End - IEC 870-5-104 Slave (2.22.13) | Name | SICAM-PAS\PASRuntimeUser |
| Product vendor | Siemens AG, PTD EA | User account type | Not administrator |
| Product name | RC-PCSW-CFE | Logon type | Proxy |
| Product version | 2.22.13 | | |
| Path | C:\Program Files (x86)\Siemens Energy\SICAM\PAS PQS\CFE\Bin\CfeIEC104Slave.exe | | |
| Operating system | Microsoft Windows 7 | | |
| Address of side of interaction | 172.17.0.220:2404 | | |
| Is a server | No | | |
| MD5 | d1daf7170987525fe2aec0c4d7926c08 | | |
| SHA256 | b6900bd74df374e5f966bd727426d642e3feb1e21e8a098d0691308904dc41cc | | |
| Signature | Invalid | | |

| Application | | Application user | |
|------------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Application name | starter.exe | Name | RDC\RDC\$ |
| Product vendor | - | User account type | Not administrator |
| Product name | - | Logon type | Undefined |

Response options

React precisely to file or process

Kill-chain view

Attack path from very beginning to first detection alert

Detection info

Extended telemetry details

The screenshot displays the Kaspersky Security Center interface, divided into two main panels. The left panel, titled "8.6 Infected or probably infected object", shows a "Kill-chain view" of an attack path. The path starts with "C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe", followed by "C:\Users\Demo\AppData\Local\Temp\autorun.exe", "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe", "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe", and finally "C:\Users\Demo..._starter.exe". A red box highlights the "Object not processed" status. The right panel, titled "Starting a process", provides detailed information about the process "C:\Users\Demo\AppData\Local\Temp\Industroyer_104_kit\starter.exe".

Starting a process

Prevent run | Move to quarantine

Process information

- Date and time: 2024-02-15 17:21:37
- Startup settings: "C:\Users\Demo\AppData\Local\Temp\Industroyer_104_kit\starter.exe" C:\Users\Demo\AppData\Local\Temp\Industroyer_104_kit\104.dll configuration1.ini
- System ID: 2604
- Integrity level: System
- User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
- Login session code: 1
- Session type: -
- Privileged user: No

Process startup file

- Name: C:\Users\Demo\AppData\Local\Temp\Industroyer_104_kit\starter.exe
- Size: 9.5 KB
- MD5 hash: [c93c8d4ee47ee7d68f4830333e94e388](#)
- SHA256 hash: [edfff8ab0bb74cb2957a02a978f2ff31a96cba78f6643701cb949bce4e36672](#)
- Created: 2024-02-15 17:21:37
- Changed: 2024-02-15 17:21:37
- Attributes: Archive
- Signed by the organization: -
- Trusted digital signature: No
- Creator: -
- Time zone identifier: Computer

Data about the download

- Web address of the download: <http://20.20.20.227:3128:3128/industroyer/starter.exe>
- Application that: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Detection information

| File | |
|----------------------------|--|
| Date and time | 2024-02-15 15:55:45 |
| Name | C:\Users\Demo\AppData\Local\Temp\Industroyer_104_kit\starter.exe |
| Size | 134 KB |
| MD5 hash | 66c67ebf254f29bf925a8ae6a3163 |
| SHA256 hash | b60f097b12087f2d809d4df945a9 |
| Created | 2024-02-15 17:21:37 |
| Changed | 2024-02-15 17:21:37 |
| Attributes | Archive |
| Signed by the organization | - |
| Trusted digital signature | No |
| Creator | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM |
| Time zone identifier | Computer |



SIGMA is an open and platform-independent standard for describing rules for detecting malicious or suspicious behavior in various logs.

“Sigma is for log files what Snort is for network traffic and YARA is for files.”

We position this technology as an **open, extensible markup language** to search anomalies on endpoints

Detection of suspicious activities, avoiding implementation of resource-intensive technologies of behavioral analysis

Rule collections:

- Detection of remote administration tools (RAT)
- ICS software behavior analysis
- Custom rules

Kill-chain view for root-cause analysis (file drops, registry changes, network connections and more)

MITRE matrix mapping and reference links

Explained in details mitigation measures including KICS for Nodes settings



8.6 Sigma rule triggered: Unauthorized creation of DeltaV graphics

Change status Show related Threat response Create allow rule Download traffic Copy details Export

Event Info Activity event graph All activity events **Sigma rule data**

Unauthorized creation of DeltaV graphics

Creation date: 2024-07-02 00:00:00
Author: Kaspersky
Severity level: **High**
Rule status: Stable

Category tags: **attack.persistence** attack.t0873 attack.scrpting attack.t0853 attack.hooking attack.t0874 attack.inhibit_response_function attack.t0838 attack.execution attack.t0863

MITRE description: <https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/> <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0873/> <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/SCRIPTING/> <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0853/> <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/HOOKING/> <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0874/> https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/INHIBIT_RESPONSE_FUNCTION/ <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838/> <https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/> <https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863/>

Description: OS user, which is not member of DeltaV groups and not authorized to perform any actions with DeltaV applications, performed modification or added new HMI VBA-based graphic on DeltaV station.


Known false positives: Legitimate modification performed by maintenance engineer.

Mitigations: Contact control system engineer who is responsible for host maintenance and find out if files modification was legitimate. If files modification was not legitimate, review Kaspersky Industrial CyberSecurity for Networks events and OS logs to determine root cause. Host might be isolated logically or physically from control network during investigation until root cause is found and resolved. Consult with onsite security maintenance personnel before performing remote host isolation to avoid any impact on performance of industrial control system or enterprise security. Configure File Integrity Monitor, the task of Kaspersky Industrial CyberSecurity for Nodes, to monitor and control file operations within critical control system folders.


Links: <https://support.kaspersky.com/KICSforNetworks/4.1/en-US/264313.htm> <https://support.kaspersky.com/KICS4Nodes/3.2/en-US/146696.htm>

| | |
|------------|---------------------|
| Created | 2017-01-01 01:00:00 |
| Changed | 2024-09-05 17:46:04 |
| Attributes | Archive |

Build your own ecosystem



Any other available data can be transferred using KICS for Networks API



Dmitry Astapov
Senior Product Manager, KICS

kaspersky